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Streamlining the Production of Clean Energy: Proposals to Reform 
the Hydroelectricity Licensing Process 
 
Travis Kavulla* and Laura Farkas** 
 
Hydroelectric power is an efficient and clean source of power.  In an era 
when air emissions dominate public concern about the environmental 
effects of the energy sector, it is a paradox that among the most highly 
regulated energy projects are hydroelectric dams, which do not combust 
fuel.  This is partly due to a failure of successive statutory enactments, 
which have transformed hydroelectric licensing from a regulatory “one-
stop shop” with a single regulator, to a process chained to a bewildering 
number of often conflicting regulatory agencies, often riven with delay.  
Hydroelectric licensing has also failed because its capacious standard of 
review encourages special-interest groups with even a marginal interest 
to seek rents from regulated users.  Even with the introduction of dispute 
resolution, and the possibility of obtaining exemptions, the barriers to 
hydroelectric permitting and relicensing are excessive.  Fortunately, a 
number of reforms would ease the regulatory burden on hydroelectric 
power expansion, while still considering and addressing environmental 
concerns. 
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I.  THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF HYDROELECTRIC 
LICENSING 
 
A. History  
Hydropower regulation in the United States was born with the 
passage of the 1902 Reclamation Act.  The Reclamation Act reversed the 
previous practice of exclusive state and local involvement in reclaiming 
land and created the Bureau of Reclamation. 1  After passage of the Act, 
the federal government funded irrigation projects across the country. 
Irrigation techniques advanced, including pumping, which would drive 
demand for future development of hydroelectric facilities.2 The 
Reclamation Act ushered in the age of federal involvement in water 
projects, but the Federal Water Power Act of 1920 (FWPA), which 
                                                          
1.  Keith H. Beauchamp, A History of Drainage and Draining 
Methods, HISTORY, STATUS AND PROSPECTS 29, 34 (George A. Pavelis ed., 1987) 
available at https://eric.ed.gov/?id=ED295043.  
2.  Id. at 43. 
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codified regulation of hydropower projects, cemented federal jurisdiction.3  
In 1930, Congress established the Federal Power Commission, now 
known as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). In 1935, 
Congress passed the Federal Power Act (FPA), which granted to the 
Federal Power Commission and its successor agency, FERC, the authority 
to regulate interstate transmission and the sale of electricity at wholesale.4  
Under the FPA, FERC is also tasked with providing licenses for non-
federal hydroelectric plants.5   
 Hydroelectric development by the federal government itself 
increased in the 1930s and 1940s.  In 1933, the Tennessee Valley 
Authority was established.6  The Great Depression, as well as flooding and 
drought in the West, prompted the building of large multipurpose water 
projects, including the Grand Coulee Dam, the Hoover Dam, and the 
Central Valley Project.7  The impressive Fort Peck Dam, the first in a 
series of dams built on the Missouri River, was also constructed.8  In 1937, 
the Bonneville Power Administration was established and the Bonneville 
Lock and Dam began operation.9  In the 1940s, bolstered by the New Deal, 
hydropower accounted for 40 percent of electrical generation in the United 
States.10  The momentum did not last, however, and by the 1960s, the 
preservation movement, emerging environmental concerns, and the 
                                                          
3.  Gifford Pinchot, The Long Struggle for Effective Federal Water 
Power Legislation, 14 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 9, 19 (1946).  
4.  Id. at 20. 
5.  16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (1935).  
6.  Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy, Water Power 
Technologies Office, History of Hydropower, U.S. DEP’T. OF ENERGY, 
https://energy.gov/eere/water /history-hydropower (last visited Jan. 17, 2018). 
7.  Bureau of Reclamation, Hydropower Program: The History of 
Hydropower Development in the U.S., https://www.usbr.gov/power/edu/history.html 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Hydropower Program]. 
8.  Bureau of Reclamation, Lewis and Clark: Big Dam Era, 
https://www.usbr.gov/gp/lewisandclark/damera.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2018). 
9.  Bonneville Power Admin., History, https://www.bpa.gov/news/ 
AboutUs/History/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Jan. 17, 2018).     
10.  Hydropower Program, supra note 9. 
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diminishing number of available sites ended the era of big federal dams.11  
Today, most dams in the United States are privately owned.12 
 
B. The Co-Mingling of Environmental Law in the FERC Licensing 
Scheme 
The earlier era of hydropower was characterized by laws that 
promoted the widespread availability of electricity, and the place of FERC 
as an agency intended to promote the construction of energy infrastructure 
and the interconnection of customers to sources of supply at reasonable 
rates.13 FERC was fundamentally an economic regulator favorably 
disposed to the abundance of supply.  In the 1970s, however, growing 
distress regarding the natural environment led to the passage of a flurry of 
environmental laws.  None of these laws were aimed specifically at 
hydroelectric development or regulation.  Nevertheless, they have shaped 
hydroelectric project licensing and relicensing profoundly.  One of the 
most iconic pieces of environmental legislation is the National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).  NEPA became effective in 1970, and 
was the first of a succession of environmental laws enacted during that 
time.14  The three key features of NEPA include the requirement that 
federal agencies consider the environmental consequences of any 
proposed action; the requirement that federal agencies prepare an 
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) examining the environmental 
effects of any major action; and the formation of the President’s Council 
on Environmental Quality (CEQ).15 The CEQ has since promulgated 
regulations that further articulate how the procedural provisions of NEPA 
                                                          
11.  Dan Tarlock, The Legal-Political Barriers to Ramping Up Hydro, 
86 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 259, 267-268 (2011). 
12.  Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, Dam Ownership in the U.S., 
https://www.fema.gov/dam-ownership-united-states (last visited Jan. 17, 2018). 
13.  16 U.S.C. § 824 et seq. (1935).  
14.  William V. Luneburg, National Environmental Policy Act (1969), 
in 3 Major Acts of Congress 16-20 (Brian K. Landsberg ed., 2004) available at 
link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/CX3407400215/UHIC?u=j071909004&xid=657f8a07. 
15. Id. at 18. 
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are to be implemented.16  Under NEPA and its associated regulations, 
FERC must undergo a review of environmental impacts and generally 
must prepare an environmental assessment (EA) or EIS before issuing a 
license for a hydroelectric project. Guidelines on the preparation of 
environmental documents illuminate the complex nature of the process.17  
 On the heels of NEPA came the Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA), 
an impactful piece of legislation when it comes to FERC hydropower 
licensing and relicensing.  Its significance stems from the requirement 
contained in Section 401 that an applicant for a federal license provide a 
certification from a state or tribe to certify that any discharges from the 
facility will comply with the CWA.18  In S.D. Warren Co. v. Maine Board 
of Environmental Protection, the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
hydroelectric dams are subject to Section 401.19  Thus, the legislation 
provides a vehicle for states to impose conditions on FERC-issued 
hydroelectric licenses.  
 Shortly after the CWA, Congress passed the Endangered Species 
Act (ESA) in 1973.20  The ESA requires FERC to consult with other 
federal agencies, and ensure that the issuance of a hydroelectric license 
will not pose a risk to a threatened or endangered species.21  Complying 
with the ESA when seeking a hydroelectric license is demanding.22   
                                                          
16.  40 C.F.R. §§ 1500-1508 (2018). 
17.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n Office of Energy Projects, 
Preparing Environmental Documents Guidelines for Applicants, Contractors, and 
Staff (Sept. 2008), available at  https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info 
/guidelines/eaguide.pdf.   
18.  Fed. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. 
No. 92-500, § 401, 86 Stat. 816, 877 (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2018)). 
19.  547 U.S. 370, 373 (2006). 
20.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (2018). 
21.  Susan A. Moore, Hydro Licensing and the Endangered Species 
Act: Implications of FERC’s Current Approach (June 1, 2007) available at 
http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/hr/print/volume-26/issue-3/feature-articles/ferc-
regulations/hydro-licensing-and-the-endangered-species-act-implications-of-
fercrsquos-current-approach.html. 
22.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n Office of Energy Projects, 
Hydropower Licensing and Endangered Species: A Guide for Applicants, 
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Through the ESA, other federal agencies have become de facto co-
regulators in the FERC licensing and relicensing process.  
 Finally, despite its nominal irrelevance to environmental issues, 
the Electric Consumer Protection Act (ECPA) of 1986 opened the 
floodgates to the involvement of still other federal and state agencies, often 
with very different goals than those of FERC, who continue to wield major 
influence in the licensing process. Specifically, the statute added new 
language that requires FERC to seek out and consider input from state and 
federal agencies tasked with resource management.23  They became 
powerful players in the process.  The legislative history of the bill indicates 
that this was the intent; these amendments were intended to ensure that the 
recommendations received from resource management agencies would 
not be easily flouted.24  The ECPA succeeded in removing a great deal of
 FERC’s prior discretion. 
 The key pieces of legislation outlined above have each contributed 
to creating the decentralized FERC hydroelectric licensing and relicensing 
process that exists today.  Yet, even these laws do not represent the entirety 
of legislation responsible for shaping the process that exists today.  All 
told, seeking an original hydroelectric license, or a subsequent one, 
requires engaging in a process that is prolonged and onerous. 
C. The Three FERC Licensing Processes 
 There are technically three processes available to obtain a new 
hydroelectric license, or to obtain a relicense.  These processes are: the 
Integrated Licensing Process (ILP); the Traditional Licensing Process 
(TLP); and the Alternative Licensing Process (ALP).25 The default process 
                                                          
Contractors, and Staff (2001) available at https://www.ferc.gov/industries/ 
hydropower/gen-info/guidelines/esa_guide.pdf. 
23.  Echeverria, John D. “The Electric Consumers Protection Act of 
1986,” 8 Energy L.J. 61, 72 (1987). 
24.  Id. 
25.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., Licensing Processes, 
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/licen-pro.asp (last 
visited Jan. 17, 2018).  
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is the ILP, but with FERC approval, one can pursue either the TLP 
or ALP.26  
 The TLP is the oldest of the three. It requires a consultation 
process to be completed before an application can be filed, however it is 
the least front-loaded of the three.27  There is little involvement from 
FERC prior to an application being submitted.28  Reduced to a handful of 
steps, FERC represents the regulatory procedure in a deceivingly simple 
form.29 Ironically, the lack of heavy FERC involvement, especially at 
points at which the applicant must deal with stakeholders, allows 
interested parties to slow the process considerably.  
 FERC issued regulations in 1997 establishing alternative licensing 
processes.30  In contrast to the TLP, the ALP’s regulatory process is far 
more front-loaded.  It is intended to be more collaborative and flexible.  
FERC acts as the adult in the room, requiring progress reports and playing 
the role of arbiter by resolving disputes during the pre-filing consultation 
phase.31  The ALP, unlike the TLP, also combines into one process the 
consultation phase, the environmental review process required by NEPA, 
and the administrative processes associated with the CWA and other stat-
utes.32  
 Finally, the ILP is the newest process.33 It was intended to 
                                                          
26.  Id. 
27. 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.38(a)(1), 16.8(a)(1) (2018). 
28.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., Processes for Hydropower 
Licenses: Traditional Licensing Process: Applicant’s Pre-Filing Process, 
https://www.ferc.gov/resources/processes/flow/hydro-1.asp (last visited Jan. 17, 
2018). 
29.  U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Processes for Hydropower Licenses: 
Traditional Licensing Process: FERC Application Process, FED. ENERGY 
REGULATORY COMM’N., https://www.ferc.gov/resources/processes/flow/hydro-2.asp 
(last visited Jan. 17, 2018). 
30.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., Guidelines to Consider for 
Participating in the Alternative Licensing Process iv,  https://www.ferc.gov/ 
industries/hydropower/indus-act/itf/alp_final.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2018). 
31.  18 C.F.R. § 4.34(i)(2)(ii). 
32.  Id. § 4.34(i)(1). 
33.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., News Release: Commission 
Adopts New Hydro Licensing Process With Promise of Faster, More Informed 
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streamline hydro project licensing.34  The ILP, like the ALP, is also heavily 
front-loaded. Applicants face many requirements, with tight timeframes, 
prior to filing an application.35  These quick turnaround times are meant to 
drive the process forward, but pose a significant burden on applicants.  The 
pre-filing consultation requirements are detailed.  Similar to the ALP’s 
dispute resolution provision, in the ILP, FERC will insert itself into the 
process if formal resolution of a study36 dispute is necessary.37  However, 
this leaves other potential disputes without an arbiter.  The ILP’s almost 
exclusive focus is on avoiding the need for superfluous and post-filing 
studies, which is admirable.   This goal is one of the reasons the 
introduction of the ILP was met with some optimism.38  However, upon 
examination, the ILP, like the ALP, simply shifts the lion’s share of the 
labor from later in the process, to earlier. The ILP is less collaborative than 
the ALP.  The ILP entails an approximately five-year process before an 
applicant can even file for a license.  During this period, the applicant’s 
time is largely spent pacifying stakeholders.  The hope is that disputes will 
be worked out prior to filing, expediting the wait time for the issuance of 
a license.  Yet despite the significant effort expended at the start, the post-
filing process is still rather extensive.39  Moreover, applicants still face the 
likely need for an EA after filing, which opens the process up to further  
                                                          
Decisions, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/indus-act/order-2002/press-
release.pdf (last visited Feb. 9, 2018). 
34.  Id. 
35.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., Processes for Hydropower 
Licenses: 5-5.5 years before expiration for relicense, https://www.ferc.gov/resources/ 
processes/flow/hydro-5.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).  
36.  Studies are requested by interested parties and conducted by FERC 
as part of FERC’s consultation requirements under Section 7 of the ESA and Section 
401 of the CWA, pursuant to 18 C.F.R. § 5.9. 
37.  18 C.F.R. § 5.14 (2018). 
38.  Michael A Swiger, and Megan M. Grant, Creating a New FERC 
Licensing Process (May 2004) available at http://64.106.168.122/webfiles/ 
MAS.HydroReview.May.2004.pdf. 
39.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., Processes for Hydropower 
Licenses: 2 years before expiration for relicense, https://www.ferc.gov/resources/ 
processes/flow/hydro-6.asp (last visited Jan. 18, 2018).  
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public participation.40  
 Regardless of which process applicants choose, they can expect to 
invest considerable time and resources, and in the case of the ALP and ILP 
large resource expenditures will occur before one can even submit an 
application.  In certain situations, a project may qualify for an exemption 
from licensing.41 However, an exempted project is still subject to 
mandatory terms and conditions set by federal and state fish and wildlife 
agencies.42 
D. The Decline in FERC’s Exclusive Authority Over Hydroelectric 
Licensing 
 FERC has authority under the FPA to issue licenses for non-
federal hydroelectric projects.43  FERC’s hydroelectric licensing power 
was initially all-encompassing.  In 1954, the United States Supreme Court 
determined that in the FPA “there is a separation of those subjects which 
remain under the jurisdiction of the states from those subjects . . . over 
which Congress vests the Federal Power Commission with authority to 
act.”44  The Court further found that “[w]here the Federal Government 
supersedes the state government there is no suggestion that [the federal 
government and states] both shall have final authority.”45 In sum, 
“provisions of the [Federal Power Act] providing for the federal plan of 
regulation leave no room or need for conflicting state controls.”46  This 
landmark case acknowledged FERC’s preemption of authority over 
hydroelectric project licensing.  FERC’s power was further affirmed in 
                                                          
40.  18 C.F.R. § 5.25 (2018). 
41.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., Exemptions from Licensing, 
https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/gen-info/licensing/exemptions.asp (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2018).  
42.  Id. 
43.  16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2005). 
44.  First Iowa Hydro-Elec. Co-op. v. Federal Power Commission, 328 
U.S. 152, 167 (1946). 
45.  Id. at 168. 
46.  Id. at 181. 
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California v. FERC, where the United States Supreme Court ruled that 
California’s lower stream flow requirements on a river where a FERC 
licensed hydroelectric project was located were preempted by the FPA.47 
 However, FERC’s abundant hydroelectric licensing power has 
eroded over the years.  The flurry of environmental laws enacted in the 
1970s, and the ECPA, which amended the FPA, drastically reduced 
FERC’s authority over hydroelectric licensing.  Significant power was 
placed in the hands of the states, via the CWA’s “401 certificate” 
requirement.48  Without one, no license can be granted.49  Essentially, a 
state’s conditions become part of a FERC hydroelectric license. Prior to 
the environmental legislation of the 1970s and the ECPA, FERC was 
already required to consider “the purposes of energy conservation, the 
protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and wildlife 
. . . the protection of recreational opportunities, and the preservation of 
other aspects of environmental quality.”50  Certain federal agencies had 
the power to prescribe conditions on projects located in or affecting federal 
reservations.51 The ECPA then required FERC to consider the 
recommendations of federal and state agencies on matters of “flood 
control, navigation, irrigation, recreation, cultural and other relevant 
resources.”52  Further, the ECPA directed that hydroelectric licenses “shall 
include conditions for such protection, mitigation, and enhancement” of 
fish and wildlife.53  To that end, such conditions must be based on 
recommendations from the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS), 
                                                          
47.  495 U.S. 490, 506 (1990). 
48.  33 U.S.C. § 1341 (1977). 
49.  33 U.S.C. § 1341(a). 
50.  16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2005). 
51.  16 U.S.C. § 796(2) (“Reservation” means “national forests, tribal 
lands embraced within Indian reservations, military reservations, and other lands and 
interests in lands owned by the United States, and withdrawn, reserved, or withheld 
from private appropriation and disposal under the public land laws; also lands and 
interests in lands acquired and held for any public purposes; but shall not include 
national monuments or national parks.”) 
52.  16 U.S.C. § 803(a) (1992). 
53.  16 U.S.C. § 803(j)(1). 
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part of the U.S. Department of Commerce, the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS), part of the U.S. Department of Interior, as well 
as state fish and wildlife agencies.54  Finally, both NMFS and FWS gained 
the authority to prescribe facilities for fish passage, such as fish ladders, 
and other conditions that they deem necessary in order to effectuate 
successful fish passage.55 This is in addition to the federal agency 
participation necessitated by NEPA, the CWA, and the ESA.  The 
environmental laws of the 1970s and the ECPA turned FERC’s role from
sole arbiter to a mere first among equals.  
 FERC resisted its shrinking control of the hydroelectric licensing 
process, but was dealt a series of blows by the federal courts.  The United 
States Supreme Court ruled unequivocally that FERC is required to accept, 
without modification, conditions that the Secretary of Interior deems 
necessary for the protection of Indian reservations.56  In PUD No. 1 of 
Jefferson County v. Washington Department of Ecology, the Court 
affirmed a state’s ability to include water quality standards in a FERC 
hydroelectric license.57  Then, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed that FERC cannot exclude state CWA certification conditions 
from hydroelectric licenses.58  Finally, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
determined that FERC lacks authority to reject fishway prescriptions as 
conditions upon reissued hydroelectric licenses.59  All of these cases 
served to cement the involvement of state and federal resource agencies in 
the FERC hydroelectric licensing process.  Despite the fact that, as the 
United States Supreme Court acknowledged, “Congress passed the 
Federal Water Power Act in order to eliminate the inefficiency and 
confusion caused by the ‘piecemeal, restrictive, negative approach’ to 
                                                          
54.  Id. 
55.  16 U.S.C. § 811 (2005). 
56.  Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla, Rincon, San Pasqual, 
Pauma, and Pala Bands of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 773-776, (1984). 
57.  511 U.S. 700 (1994). 
58.  Am. Rivers, Inc. v. FERC, 129 F.3d 99 (2nd Cir. 1997). 
59.  Am. Rivers v. FERC, 201 F. 3d 1186, 1206 (9th Cir. 2000).  
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licensing,”60 relevant federal law and case law has essentially achieved a 
return to the “inefficiency and confusion” that the FWPA was originally 
intended to resolve. 
II.  HYDROELECTRIC LICENSING’S FALSE PROMISE OF 
REGULATION IN THE ‘PUBLIC INTEREST’ 
 
A. The Ever-Expanding Public Interest 
The U.S. Department of Energy has observed that “the 
hydropower regulatory environment has evolved over time rather than 
having been planned and implemented at one point in time as a unified, 
fully efficient, integrated process.”61  This is an understatement.  The 
generation of electricity by hydropower is perhaps the purest example of 
Ronald Coase’s observation that the products “traded on the market are 
not, as is often supposed by economists, physical entities but the rights to 
perform certain actions[,] and the rights which individuals possess are 
established by the legal system.”62  Hydroelectric licensing is governed by 
a capacious “public interest” standard under Section 10 of the FPA, and a 
series of other standards that the subsequent acts described above have 
given rise to.  While licenses are issued bureaucratically by a single 
agency, FERC, they require the imprimatur of a variety of federal and state 
natural-resource agencies, each of which have their own institutional 
interests which are narrower than the public interest writ large.  Other than 
government agencies, many stakeholders also claim to have interests 
                                                          
60.  Escondido Mut. Water Co. v. La Jolla, Rincon, San Pasqual, 
Pauma, and Pala Bands of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 773 (1984) (quoting First 
Iowa Hydro-Elec. Co-op, 328 U.S. at 180). 
61.  U.S. Dept. of Energy, Hydropower Vision, https://www.energy. 
gov/sites/prod/files/2016/10/f33/Hydropower-Vision-Chapter-4-10212016.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
62.  Ronald H. Coase, The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic 
Science in Memory of Alfred Nobel 1991: Prize Lecture (Dec. 9, 1991) available at 
https://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economic-sciences/laureates/1991/coase-
lecture.html.  
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entailed by “the public interest” along or besides waterways.  FERC, the 
regulator, is responsible for enmeshing this accumulation of claims within 
a license as conditions. Each condition weighs against the wider 
economics of the project—the requirement for fisheries, or waterfowl 
brood areas, or recreational boating sites all imposing costs on the 
licensee—so that the hydroelectric licensing process is also a fine example 
of what Richard Posner called “taxation by regulation.”63  Since customers 
typically bear the licensee’s costs through public utility regulation, the 
many conditions attendant to licensing can be understood to “compel 
members of the public to support a service that the market would provide 
at a reduced level, or not at all.”64  Finally, these licenses are time-limited 
by statute,65 and they cannot be transferred except through a similar 
regulatory process.66  
 These three regulatory features—a capacious standard of review, 
the many cooks in the kitchen, and the always looming prospect of a 
decade-long relicensure process—have resulted in a temporary, non-
transferable, and conditional property right for the licensee.  A highly 
attenuated right to perform a certain action of the type Coase describes, 
an interested party obtains this license only through a significant outlay 
associated not just with the cost to build and operate a project, but also 
with the transaction costs associated with obtaining that right by satisfying 
conditions whose value usually lacks an objective yardstick. This 
regulatory process serves the whole of the public interest to an only 
questionable extent, as a real-life example of it demonstrates. 
 
 
 
                                                          
63.  Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 22, 29 (1971). 
64.  Id. 
65. 16 U.S.C. § 799 (1980). 
66. 18 C.F.R. § 9.1 et seq. 
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B. Case Study: The Kilarc-Cow Creek Project 
The two small dams that together comprised the 4.6-megawatt 
Kilarc-Cow Creek project in California are a case study in the convoluted 
regulatory process that exists for small hydroelectric facilities.  When the 
century-old project faced another license renewal in the early 2000s, 
Pacific Gas & Electric (PG&E)’s preliminary investigation concluded that 
the project would face substantial opposition from federal agencies and 
environmental interest groups unless conditions associated with fish were 
attached to the relicense.  Instead, the utility, California’s largest, opted to 
propose to decommission the project.67  
 Although hydroelectric relicensing is intended to be a highly 
public process, the mere prospect of the conditions that might arise out of 
this process led PG&E to pre-emptively elect to not even attempt obtaining 
Kilarc-Cow Creek’s renewal.  Instead, PG&E decided on a course to 
surrender it.68  Paradoxically, the public nature of the relicensing process 
appears to have foreclosed its occurrence at all and deprived members of 
the public a significant opportunity to urge the project’s continuation.69  
                                                          
67. Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., Kilarc-Cow Creek Hydroelectric Project 
Preliminary Proposed Decommissioning Plan (Sept. 10, 2007), http://www.kilarc-
cowcreek.com/Lists/Announcements/Attachments/4/3008806_PGandE_Kilarc%20 
cow_PPDP_09-10-07.pdf 
68.  Letter from Annette Faragalia to Fed.  Energy Regulatory 
Comm’n. (Mar. 30, 2005), Pac. Gas and Elec. Co., available at http://www.kilarc-
cowcreek.com/Document%20Library/Decommissioning%20Documents%20and% 
20Comments%20Received/Decommissioning%20Agreements/CC_033105Agreeme
ntFERCFiling.pdf. 
69.  One member of the public commented during the EIS process to 
examine PG&E’s decommissioning proposal, “I was very saddened by the suggestion 
of closing Kilarc. Our daughter and granddaughter both caught their first fish at Kilarc.  
It was the one place that my mother could walk into to fish, which she dearly loved to 
do… I do hope this decision is reconsidered.” The utility responded: “The FERC 
licensing process does not allow PG&E a further opportunity to renew its operating 
license.  PG&E elected not to apply for a new license and the deadline for relicensing 
the Kilarc-Cow Creek Project has passed.” Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Draft 
Responses to Comments Received on Preliminary Proposed Decommissioning Plan, 
2 (Sept. 12, 2007) available at http://www.kilarccowcreek.com/Document% 
20Library/Decommissioning%20Documents%20and%20Comments%20Received/C
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Although not readily accessible, the utility’s assumptions about what it 
would cost to renew the license must have been very substantial because 
the ultimate cost to PG&E and its ratepayers to decommission the project 
amounted to $9 million, or nearly $2,000 per kilowatt of installed capacity, 
plus whatever amount it spent to replace the lost generation.70  The 
decommissioning cost alone exceeds the capital cost of a new natural-gas 
fired plant on a per-kilowatt basis.71  In other words, it likely cost PG&E 
more to decommission a hydroelectric plant than to build a new gas plant, 
and yet the utility nonetheless elected not to seek a renewal of the project 
license, suggesting the extremely high cost predicted to relicense the 
facility.  
 Once PG&E submitted its application to surrender the license, 
FERC assembled a draft EIS pursuant to NEPA. After receiving 
comments, it dismissed a proposal from a firm apparently more ambitious 
than PG&E to receive the license and preserve the facility for future 
hydroelectric generation.  It issued a final EIS that granted PG&E its 
request to surrender its license and ordered work to be done to remove 
facilities that impeded fish passage along the waterways.  
 The Final EIS can be understood as the locus of regulation for this 
project.  The document is a strange amalgam of highly nuanced analysis 
of certain aspects of hydroelectric operations, with almost a blind eye to 
others.  Notably, in a document spanning 342 pages, regulators spent all 
                                                          
omment%20Response%20Table/Kilarc-Cow_Creek_PPDP_Comment_Response_ 
Table.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
70.  Final Envtl. Impact Statement for Hydropower License Surrender, 
Kilarc-Cow Creek Hydroelectric Project, FERC Project No. 606, xxiv (Aug. 2011) 
available at https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/enviro/eis/2011/08-16-11. 
asp. 
71.  For example, Montana’s NorthWestern Energy reports a combined 
cycle combustion turbine, used to produce energy on a more consistent basis, costs 
$1,400 per kilowatt of capacity, while a flexible peaking unit that uses an internal 
combustion engine, costs $1,280.  MONT. PUB. SERV. COMM’N, NorthWestern Energy: 
2015 Electricity Supply Resource Procurement Plan, PSC. MT.gov, Docket No. 
N2015.11.91, p. 9-3  (Mar. 2016) available at http://psc.mt.gov/Docs/Electronic 
Documents/pdfFiles/N20151191-AbsarokaEnergyCommentsNWE2015Plan.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2018). 
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of 45 words on their analysis of the emission effects of the power plant’s 
continued operations.72 Despite putative concern with environmental 
effects, the regulatory process selectively concentrated on fisheries and 
land use issues.  The process, in this way, was the opposite of “think 
globally, act locally.”  
 In the case of Kilarc-Cow Creek, the regulator waived off 
concerns about emissions as de minimus.  The project was, the Final EIS 
found, a mere 0.2% of PG&E’s overall power generation portfolio, and 
only 0.12% of the state’s hydroelectric generation.73  It is true that, in the 
scope of power generation, Kilarc-Cow Creek was a small project. 
However, to undertake a small measure of the work which the regulator 
did not do, we estimated that this very small project’s continued operation 
would have abated about 16,000 tons of carbon-dioxide annually, the 
equivalent of the emissions of 3,000 cars per year.74  
                                                          
72.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n., supra note 70, at 209.  
73.  Id. at 208-09. 
74.  The authors made this calculation using 2016 data within the 
EPA’s AVERT tool, which is an Excel-based model that allows users to input the 
estimated production of a renewable resource to show which emissions from the 
portfolio of power plants in a region—in this case California—are avoided by the 
renewable plant’s operation.  Notably, EPA’s model has built-in production profiles 
for wind, utility-scale, and roof-top solar, yet it seems not even to countenance the 
role hydropower might play in abating emissions.  
The authors derived a round-the-clock estimate of megawatt production in 
an average hour by dividing the project’s reported annual production of 31,100 
megawatt-hours by 8,760 (the number of hours in the year).  The quotient is the sole 
variable that the AVERT model requires to make an estimate of emissions, although 
the authors could undertake a significantly more refined estimate if they were to use 
the project’s hourly production profile.  Since our point is that none of its regulators 
studied these effects at all, we found a flyspeck analysis such at this unnecessarily 
burdensome for this demonstrative point.  
A hydropower project’s avoided emissions, of course, will be both a product 
of the amount of energy it produces, when it produces that energy, and where in the 
nation’s grid it produces it, since each region has a different set of resources creating 
emissions.  For example, the iteration of AVERT tool we used has a 2016 data set for 
California.  If one assumes that California is less reliant on emitting resources today 
than it had been when Kilarc-Cow was decommissioned, the avoided carbon 
emissions of the project would have been higher. 
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Imagine, however, the regulator’s logic being extended to the 
myriad other issues which arise in the context of hydroelectric licensing, 
from recreation, to fish passage, to the effect on irrigation, to the 
preservation of historic landmarks.  The entirety of the project’s negative 
and positive effects could have been said to be de minimus because the 
project impacts only a small area which has no endemic species or 
particularly unique features.  Yet the project’s effects on biological and 
cultural resources received, throughout the Kilarc-Cow Creek EIS, a 
detailed, flyspeck analysis that includes many lengthy discussions of the 
optimal water temperatures for various non-endangered fish species and 
the amount of stocking of these species that has occurred for recreation. 
Were one to have extended the de minimus excusal that is the centerpiece 
of the regulator’s analysis on carbon emissions to this substance, it would 
have been just as easy to conclude: Go protect the fish elsewhere. 
 In reading the EIS thoroughly, it becomes obvious that the 
regulator failed to engage in a cost-benefit analysis that considered the 
trade-offs between the positive and negative effects of the project.  The 
regulator made no effort to calculate the value to consumers of avoiding 
replacement generation or the value of the positive environmental benefits 
the project created.  In doing so, despite the EIS’s page count, the regulator 
could not have made an educated guess about the trade-offs of the various 
alternatives the EIS considered, which included one to preserve the 
project’s powerhouse for a future licensee’s use. 
 To be clear, we are not necessarily arguing that FERC should have 
relicensed the Kilarc-Cow Creek project.  Instead, we merely submit that 
a utility’s preemptive decision to surrender the license is indicative of how 
                                                          
The annual production of Kilarc-Cow was reported in a trade press account 
of the project’s decommissioning.  Final FERC EIS endorses removal of 4.6-MW 
Kilarc-Cow Creek, http://www.hydroworld.com/articles/2011/08/final-ferc-eis-
endorses-removal-of-4-6-mw-kilarc-cow-creek.html (Aug. 25, 2011). The 
comparison estimate for vehicles derives from the EPA’s estimate of an average 
annual carbon-emissions of a passenger vehicle.  Envtl. Protection Agency, 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from a Typical Passenger Vehicle,  https://www.epa.gov/ 
greenvehicles/greenhouse-gas-emissions-typical-passenger-vehicle-0 (last visited 
Feb. 9, 2018).  
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poorly the process works.  It likely disadvantages members of the public 
such as the grandfather who reminisced about fishing access—people that 
the U.S. Department of Energy euphemistically labels “non-technical 
stakeholders” in its review of hydroelectric licensing.75  The hydroelectric 
regulatory process may also lose sight of the public interest as a whole, 
with respect to carbon-dioxide emissions, in favor of interest groups that 
purport to represent the public, but who may merely represent a narrower 
interest.76  Similarly, the Kilarc-Cow Creek case study is a fine example 
of NEPA’s implementation flaws, where the EIS is a document which silos 
individual aspects of the project’s positive and negative effects, not 
effectively engaging in any economic analysis to trade them off against 
one another.  It also focuses laser-like on some effects, while essentially 
ignoring others.  The EIS, as a whole, is a testament to the institutional 
subjectivity of a regulator who possesses an overly broad mandate to 
consider “the public interest,” where, ironically, the whole goes largely 
unconsidered because of institutional preferences to focus on certain 
effects over others. 
C. When the ‘Public Interest’ Isn’t the Public’s Interest 
Kilarc-Cow Creek is not the only example of a licensing process 
which loses sight of the big picture.  In February 2017, Oroville Dam’s 
spillway catastrophically ruptured in the wake of significant rainfall in 
California, water spilled over the top of the project’s weir, and an 
emergency spillway had to be used for the first time since the project’s 
construction five decades before.77  While the events unfolded over several 
days’ time, the threat of the spillway eroding or collapsing led to the risk 
                                                          
75.  U.S. Dep’t. of Energy, supra note 56, at 387.  
76.  Supra note 71 (for the public comment this observation alludes to); 
supra note 69 (for the letter to FERC, which indicated that PG&E’s agreement to pre-
emptively and voluntarily surrender its license had only two non-governmental, public 
groups, which were Trout Unlimited and Friends of the River). 
77.  Independent Forensic Team Report: Oroville Dam Spillway 
Incident 9 (Jan. 5, 2018) https://damsafety.org/sites/default/files/files/ Independent 
%20Forensic%20Team%20Report%20Final%2001-05-18.pdf. 
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of an enormous flood.  Authorities ordered an evacuation of the area 
downriver, inhabited by 188,000 people.78  
 Oroville’s license expired more than a decade ago, in January 
2007, and the project has been in limbo ever since, subject to periodic, 
temporary renewals.  This is despite the fact that a final settlement 
agreement was signed by 51 different institutional stakeholders, a veritable 
playground of special interests from bicyclists, to canoers, to horseback 
riders, to environmentalists, to the Rotary Club, and the U.S. Department 
of Interior.79  The project’s relicensing website even has videos showing 
the fanfare of the March 2006 celebratory signing ceremony.80  Despite an 
EIS having been completed in the same year as the settlement agreement, 
the project’s relicense has remained pending due to other federal agencies’ 
lackadaisical work flow, including a biological opinion from the NMFS, a 
439-page opus that was released only in December 2016.81  The license 
continues to await final federal approval.  Like other settlements and 
licensing orders, the still-pending settlement agreement for the relicense is 
a hodgepodge of conditions representing the interests of those agreeing to 
settlement, whose interests may not necessarily be synonymous with a 
perspective on the whole of the public interest.  It is noteworthy, given the 
recent events at Oroville Dam, that the settlement contains more detail in 
its discussion of the four waterfowl brood ponds, which are to be a 
condition of the license, than it does on the new requirement for an “early 
warning system” to coordinate the assortment of federal agencies and 
                                                          
78.  Tony Bizjak, Mass chaos of Oroville evacuation prompts worry 
over exit strategy, Sacramento Bee (Feb. 18, 2017), http://www.sacbee.com/news/ 
local/transportation/back-seat-driver/article133485154.html.  
79.  Cal. Dep’t. of Water Res., Final Settlement Agreement (Mar. 21, 
2006), http://www.water.ca.gov/orovillerelicensing/ settlement_agreement.cfm. 
80.  Id.  
81.  US DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE NATIONAL OCEANIC AND 
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, Orville Facilities Biological Opinion (Dec 5. 2016), 
available at http://www.water.ca.gov/hlpco/docs/2017/20161205_NMFS_P2100_ 
Aquatic%20Biological%20Opinion.pdf.  
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emergency responders “before and during flood emergency events.”82  
Unlike the meticulous detail it specifies for other conditions, the settlement 
calls for the details of the early warning system to be worked out later—
one year after the license’s issuance.83  Since the license has been pending 
for 11 years, it apparently has never been consummated.  
 The whole process is even more surreal when one considers that 
the licensee is not a private party, but the State of California.  One would 
think the state sovereign would be capable of representing the public 
interest on its own, and yet oddly, its license is a vehicle for rent-seeking 
within a federal process.  While FERC has a rigorous dam safety regime, 
and its response to the Oroville near-catastrophe has been commendable, 
the dam’s licensing saga is another notable example of a process that loses 
sight of truly important features of the project’s most significant public 
impacts.  The dawdling approach to the relicense freezes many improve-
ments in the pendency of a long regulatory proceeding.  
 In balancing the many interests present within the licensing 
process, the regulator has an assortment of federal law to look to.  For 
example, the ESA places an almost incalculably high value on the 
preservation of listed species.  It would not be lawful for a regulator, on 
its own authority, to countermand a listing decision made (by another 
regulator) pursuant to this statute.  Elsewhere, the mandate for “the public 
interest” is vague.  How, for example, to calculate the social value of 
recreational opportunities, which feature prominently in many hydro 
licenses?  Problematically, FERC has not created any real metric for this 
style of regulation, instead relying on stakeholders merely to raise their 
hand in order to extract a condition.  
 Montana’s Mystic Dam, for example, is required by a U.S. Forest 
Service licensing condition to establish a “whitewater flow plan to 
                                                          
82.  Settlement Agreement for Licensing of the Oroville Facilities, 
FERC Project No. 2100 (March 2006), available at  http://www.water.ca.gov/ 
orovillerelicensing/settlement_agreement.cfm (Compare pp. A36-37 (waterfowl 
brood ponds) to A41-42 (early warning system). 
83.  Id.  
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improve whitewater boating opportunities.”84  FERC’s order does not 
describe why such a condition is in the public interest.  Yet, the tacit 
premise appears to be that the condition restores a recreational opportunity 
that kayakers would have availed themselves of had a dam not been 
constructed in 1925 and had kayaking been an undertaking enjoyed during 
the turn of the last century.  The resulting plan for whitewater release is 
highly convoluted: the licensee measures downstream flows in cubic-feet 
per second (cfs) on Wednesday at noon and if the flow is between 286 and 
400 cfs, the licensee will “endeavor to release” 500 cfs for five hours on 
the following Saturday and Sunday, except if inflows are rapidly 
decreasing at an upstream gauge, in which event it will do so only on 
Saturdays, but if flows are between 250 and 285 cfs, the flows will also be 
limited to Saturday unless the upstream flows are lower than 250 cfs, in 
which event there will be no release at all, which is also the case if the 
flows reported downstream are greater than 400 cfs.85  It is, the reader will 
observe, rather precise—but the same cannot be said of the decision to 
include this requirement in the first place.  As with the Kilarc-Cow Creek 
Project, the licensing order does not even attempt to engage in cost-benefit 
analysis to reason whether the foregone, emissions-free power generation 
is worth more, or less, than whatever the whitewater benefits may be.  
 Perhaps unlike certain biological requirements that may be truly 
an issue of the commons, one should assume there is a particularized 
compensable value to recreational and certain other interests.  In other 
words, what would these whitewater kayakers be willing to pay?  In such 
circumstances, even if the eventual service is going to be subsidized to 
some degree by a hydroelectric licensee, it seems reasonable to attempt to 
test the market for a willingness to pay rather than putting a regulator in a 
position of having to hypothesize the demand for these services and their 
                                                          
84.  Order Issuing New License, Project No. 2301-022, 9 (Dec. 17, 
2007) 121 F.E.R.C. ¶ 62,198, p. 9 (This condition was imposed by the U.S. Forest 
Service’s authority to impose conditions which FERC must adopt, under § 4(e) of the 
Federal Power Act.). 
85.  NorthWestern Energy, Protocol for West Rosebud Creek 
Whitewater Flow Enhancement, http://www.mysticlakeproject/pdf_2015/mystic-
whitewater-protocol-NWE.pdf. 
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value to the user.  
 The next part of this paper discusses how the regulatory process 
could be streamlined and become less arbitrary.  It suffices here to observe 
that there are inevitably trade-offs between positive and negative 
consequences of any particular hydroelectric project, just as there are with 
any piece of the energy industry.  There are also trade-offs between pieces 
of the complex electric system; less supply from one project will be 
backfilled by another.  Therefore, it is important to treat hydroelectric 
production to no greater, or lesser, scrutiny than other impactful parts of 
that industry receive.  
 As it exists today, FERC and its sister agencies’ regulation is a 
nitpicky style of central planning, subsuming each small detail of a 
project’s existence.  This amoebic regulation may purport to balance 
divergent interests, but on close examination, such an undertaking is really 
a series of blind guesses in the absence of a clear price signal that values 
each aspect of the trade-offs.  In economic terms, “there is no objective 
basis for balancing off distributive benefits against allocative costs.”86  
This is a recipe for subjective decision-making—albeit, thanks to the EIS 
page count, it wears a veneer of documentation.  
 Both regulators and policymakers should more clearly articulate 
what “the public interest” entails in terms of the granularity of regulatory 
consideration.  Should it entail the preservation of a species?  Yes.  Should 
it entail making sure the water is a few degrees colder so that a species 
prevalent in other areas can overcome inter-species competition in this 
project’s reservoir?  Perhaps not.  In this regard, procedural reforms that 
either streamline the regulatory approvals needed for certain projects, 
hasten the process, or extend the lifespan of the license are detailed in the 
next section.  They would be welcome, albeit tacit, declarations that the 
public interest is not well served if transaction costs make smaller projects 
unviable.  Likewise, as the final section of this paper details, statutory 
reforms should minimize transaction costs by imposing on regulatory 
                                                          
86.  Posner, supra note 59, at 44. 
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agencies, not licensees, requirements that the processes be more timely, as 
well as less subjective.  
III.  REGULATORY SOLUTIONS 
 
The difficulties associated with the hydroelectric licensing 
processes are notorious. They have become only more complex over time.  
In 1998, FERC and other federal agencies formed an Interagency Task 
Force to Improve Hydroelectric Licensing Processes (ITF).87 The ITF 
recognized the need for more straightforward hydroelectric licensing, and 
issued a series of reports and recommendations in 2001.88  Ultimately, the 
ITF resulted in the creation of FERC’s current default licensing process, 
the ILP, which as previously discussed, is still lengthy and burdensome to 
applicants.  It is apparent that more improvements are necessary.  While 
major changes will be necessary to prompt significant improvement in the 
efficiency of the process, certain smaller changes can be achieved now, to 
more immediate effect.  
 In 2017, the President issued the Executive Order on Promoting 
Energy Independence and Economic Growth, which recognizes that it is 
in the national interest to promote development of energy resources, 
including electricity derived from flowing water.89  The Executive Order 
called on federal agencies, including FERC, to identify existing 
regulations that potentially burden the development and use of domestic 
energy resources.90  In response, FERC recently issued a report whereby 
it identified three areas where “material burdens” may exist for applicants 
                                                          
87.  Interagency Task Force, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n. (Jun. 
28, 2010), available at https://www.ferc.gov/industries/hydropower/indus-act/itf.asp.  
88.  Id.  
89.  Presidential Exec. Order on Promoting Energy Independence and 
Economic Growth, Exec. Order No. 13,783 (2017) available at 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/presidential-executive-order-
promoting-energy-independence-economic-growth/.  
90.  Id. 
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seeking a hydroelectric license.91  These include the licensing process, 
exemption process, and determinations on deficient applications.92  FERC 
also proposed possible solutions.  In addition to the solutions proposed by 
FERC in its report, collaboration and delegation within the licensing 
process and conditioned licensing offer additional opportunites for 
increased efficiency.  
A. Streamlining FERC’s Licensing Process 
In its report, FERC asserted that eliminating the need to seek 
permission prior to pursuing the TLP or ALP may save time and reduce 
costs to applicants.93  Allowing applicants to pursue the licensing 
processes that best fits their specific situation, whether that be the TLP or 
ALP, without seeking FERC’s approval first, is a small change, but a step 
in the right direction.  FERC should also consider the necessity of having 
three separate licensing processes in the first place.  None of the processes 
are particularly streamlined, including the default ILP, which was meant 
to alleviate concerns regarding the burdensome nature of licensing.  
Choosing between the three processes only increases confusion on the part 
of applicants, and forces applicants to weigh the potential costs of 
attempting to pursue one process over another.  Ideally, a single, 
streamlined process would exist.  That is perhaps easier said than done, 
however, and in the absence of such a process, allowing applicants to 
freely pursue the most appropriate process, without the additional 
procedure of seeking FERC’s blessing, would be beneficial.  
 FERC also proposed making optional the draft license application 
or preliminary licensing proposal.94  A draft application must respond “to 
any comments and recommendations made by any resource agency and 
                                                          
91.  Review of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Agency Actions 
Pursuant to Executive Order 13,783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic 
Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,517 (Nov. 1, 2017).  
92.  Id. at 50,519. 
93.  Id. 
94.  Id.  
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Indian tribe either during the first stage of consultation,”95 or to any 
requests for studies or information that are made after the first stage of 
consultation.96  A preliminary licensing proposal describes the project, 
describes the operation and maintenance plans, and includes a draft 
environmental analysis.97  Releasing applicants from the obligation to 
provide either a draft license application or a preliminary licensing 
proposal would certainly help an applicant cut through the licensing 
morass.  However, there are a few reasons why this proposal would not be 
as beneficial to applicants as it may appear.  First, there is already a 
provision which allows for an applicant to receive a waiver of the draft 
license application or preliminary licensing proposal requirement.98 
Removing the need to seek the waiver does relieve some burden.  Yet, 
making the draft license application or preliminary licensing proposal 
optional only defers inevitable conflict.  Additionally, FERC suggested 
that the ILP may be burdensome in terms of the schedule established for 
the pre-filing process.99  Its proposed solution is to reduce certain 
timeframes, including the time frame in which an applicant must file a 
revised study plan, for example.100  Such a change would hardly relieve 
burden on the applicant.  The time frames that should be shortened are the 
timeframes for stakeholders to submit comments, which FERC does 
suggest.101  Only then will the burden on the applicant be relieved.  The 
applicant’s obligations are already so numerous that forcing applicants to 
adhere to stricter timeframes does not provide relief.  In addition, the time 
saving that results from shortening some timeframes in the ILP is a mere 
three months. For a process that currently takes years, three months are 
negligible.  
                                                          
95.  18 C.F.R. § 4.38(c)(4)(i). 
96.  18 C.F.R. § 4.38(c)(ii). 
97.  18 C.F.R. § 5.16 (2017). 
98.  18 C.F.R. § 5.16(f). 
99.  Review of Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Agency Actions 
Pursuant to Executive Order 13,783, Promoting Energy Independence and Economic 
Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,517 at 50,519. 
100.  Id. 
101.  Id. 
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 Current licensing practice is to set a thirty-year license term, even 
when there is little redevelopment, construction, or environmental 
mitigation and enhancement.102  Pursuant to the FPA, FERC can issue a 
hydroelectric license “for a period not exceeding fifty years.”103  FERC 
should immediately begin issuing licenses for no less than 50 years. This 
change in policy is easily implemented and will result in enormous 
positive impact for applicants.  Reducing the frequency of relicensing, a 
process which, as discussed, is extremely convoluted and slow, will 
provide one of the most tangible improvements from the applicant’s 
perspective.  
 Minimum applicant filing requirements is another area where 
FERC identified a burden that could be reduced.  Presently, FERC 
regulations allow for a less grueling licensing process for small water 
projects with 5 megawatts (MW) or less installed capacity.104  Projects 
with an installed capacity of greater than 5 MW are subject to more 
requirements and a more complex process.105  FERC asserted that this 5 
MW distinction was the result of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies 
Act (PURPA), which was implemented in part to encourage hydroelectric 
power production at existing small dams.106  PURPA  mandates “simple 
and expeditious licensing procedures . . . for small hydroelectric power 
projects in connection with existing dams.”107  PURPA called for 
exemptions from licensing requirements for small hydroelectric power 
projects with an installed capacity of 5 MW or less.108  However, PURPA 
was amended and now a small water project is one with an installed 
capacity of 10 MW or less.109  FERC posits that updating its regulations to 
treat a 5-10 MW project the same as a 5 MW or less project could alleviate 
                                                          
102.  Id. at 50,520. 
103.  16 U.S.C. § 799 (2012). 
104.  18 C.F.R. §§ 4.60-4.61 (2017). 
105.  18 C.F.R. §§ 4.40-4.41 (2017); 18 C.F.R. §§ 4.50-4.51 (2017). 
106.  16 U.S.C. § 2701. 
107.  16 U.S.C. § 2705(a). 
108. Pub. L. 96-294, title IV, § 408(b). 
109.  16 U.S.C. § 2705(d); Review of Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission Agency Actions Pursuant to Executive Order 13,783, Promoting Energy 
Independence and Economic Growth, 82 Fed. Reg. 50,517. 
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burden on applicants.  This is an obviously reasonable reform. Smaller, 
less impactful projects should not be subject to the same licensing process 
and requirements as large projects which have a greater impact on the 
surrounding environment and communities. Subjecting small projects to 
extensive processes is inefficient and unnecessary.  The process should be 
tailored to fit the size and potential impact of the project.  FERC’s 
regulations should be updated to reflect the amendment of PURPA. 
B. Increasing Availability of Exemptions and Second Chances 
Regarding the exemption process, FERC has identified the 
requirement that a project add new capacity in order to qualify for an 
exemption as a potential burden.110  Specifically, FERC had previously 
determined that to qualify for a particular license exemption, a project 
must be one “in which capacity will be installed or increased” to a “total 
installed capacity of not more than 10 MW.”111  FERC proposes revising 
the regulations to remove the requirement of installing or increasing 
capacity to be eligible for this particular exemption.  FERC should do this 
and more.  Increasing the availability of exemptions, and making it easier 
to seek and obtain them, will also aid in ending the one-size-fits-all 
approach to licensing.  Certain projects, specifically those that are smaller 
or unlikely to have a significant impact, should be granted exemptions.  
The requirement to add new capacity is arbitrary and results in excluding 
otherwise appropriate projects from exemptions.  In many cases a faster, 
simpler process with minimal participation from other entities is 
appropriate.  Such a process especially makes sense when seeking to 
relicense.  In such situations, stakeholders likely had the opportunity to 
weigh in earlier.  Exemptions can help ensure that the process fits the 
project.  Additionally, FERC has suggested allowing dismissed exemption 
applications to be converted into an application for a license, eliminating 
extra work on the part of the applicant.112  This proposal is an obvious and 
                                                          
110.  Id.  
111.  18 C.F.R. § 4.30(b)(31); see also 18 C.F.R. § 4.103 (2017). 
112.  82 Fed. Reg. 50,517. 
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easy solution.  Along those same lines, when it comes to deficient 
applications, FERC has raised the possibility of changing the regulations 
that prevent an applicant from refiling a rejected application.113  If an 
applicant corrects deficiencies, refiling should be permitted.  Likewise, to 
be relicensed, applicants must follow specific requirements, and failure to 
do so results in a rejected application that cannot be refiled.114  Such a 
situation represents a disastrous turn of events for a project attempting to 
obtain a subsequent license.  Applicants undergoing the relicensing 
process should be permitted to correct deficiencies.  The consequences of 
an existing hydroelectric resource being unable to correct an application 
for a subsequent license far outweigh the fault of making a mistake in the 
application. 
C. Collaboration, Delegation, and the Promise of Conditioned 
Licenses  
Increasing regulatory efficiencies would be easier if FERC acted as 
the sole authority in matters of hydroelectric licensing.  However, as we 
know from statutory law and case law, this is not the reality.  Multiple 
federal agencies now wield considerable influence in the process.  Rather 
than serving in a mere advisory role, certain agencies, pursuant to laws 
discussed above, are empowered to impose mandatory conditions. 
Therefore, no improvements can be made without the cooperation of these 
agencies. Some progress on this front has already occurred.  FERC has 
entered into a number of memoranda of understanding (MOU) with other 
entities, which aim to improve teamwork and process efficiency.115  One 
MOU, executed in 2016 between FERC and the Army Corps of Engineers, 
is intended to streamline the process required to authorize hydroelectric 
                                                          
113.  Id. at 50,519–20. 
114.  18 C.F.R. § 16.9(b)(4) (2017).  
115.  FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, Memoranda of 
Understanding (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.ferc.gov/legal/mou.asp (last visited Feb. 
4, 2018). 
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development at Corps dams.116  MOUs between FERC and federal 
resource agencies, especially the ones empowered to place conditions on 
licenses, could increase early and effective cooperation, which potentially 
results in an easier and faster process.  As discussed, states, largely due to 
the CWA, are also powerful stakeholders in licensing of dams.  An MOU 
between FERC and the California State Water Resources Control Board 
coordinates pre-application activities, such as consultation, environmental 
scoping, study planning, and commenting on the applicant’s preliminary 
licensing proposal for proposed hydroelectric projects.117 The consultation 
requirements, environmental scoping, and studies are perhaps the largest 
impediments to an efficient licensing process.  It is encouraging that this 
MOU addresses these problem areas in the process.  FERC has also 
entered into an MOU with the State of Colorado, to simplify the 
authorization of small scale hydroelectric projects.118  The MOU delegates 
certain tasks to the state, including prescreening projects for eligibility, 
and consulting with federal and state agencies, tribes, and the public.119  
Further delegation of authority to states may be a viable method of 
increasing the efficiency of the licensing process.  States are more aware 
of local attitudes toward hydroelectric development.120 States typically 
                                                          
116.  FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, Memorandum of 
Understanding between United States Army Corp of Engineers and Federal Energy 
Regulatory Commission on Non-Federal Hydropower Projects (July 21, 2016), 
available at https://www.ferc.gov/legal/mou/2016/07-21-16.pdf.  
117.  FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, Memorandum of 
Understanding between the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the 
California State Water Resources Control Board Concerning Coordination of Pre-
Application Activities for Non-Federal Hydropower Proposals in California (Nov. 
2013), available at https://www.ferc.gov/legal/mou/mou-caswb-11-2013.pdf.  
118.  FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, Memorandum of 
Understanding between Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the State of 
Colorado Through the Governor’s Energy Office to Streamline and Simplify the 
Authorization of Small Scale Hydropower Projects (Aug. 24, 2010), available at 
https://www.ferc.gov /legal/mou/mou-co.pdf.  
119.  Id. 
120.  Gina S. Warren, Hydropower: It’s a Small World After All, 91 NEB. 
L. REV. 925, 976 (2013). 
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have a better handle on local environmental conditions.121  States may also 
be less cumbersome than the federal government and can implement 
policies faster.122  A possible solution, one which furthers the objective of 
abolishing the one-size-fits-all approach to licensing, is simply to cede 
authority for the regulation of small hydroelectric projects entirely to the 
states.123  Recalling the history of hydroelectric regulation, the federal 
government consolidated the federal preemption of hydroelectric 
regulation with the FWPA and the subsequent FPA.124  The environmental 
legislation of the 1970s served to decentralize FERC’s authority over 
hydroelectric regulation, spreading it out amongst other federal agencies, 
as well as states.  Perhaps, in the name of a more case specific and less 
arduous licensing process, this trend should continue full circle with 
significant regulatory authority granted to the states. 
 Conditioned licenses are another highly effective way in which to 
improve process efficiency.  In 2007, FERC issued a Policy Statement on 
Conditioned Licenses for Hydrokinetic Projects.125  Essentially, FERC can 
issue a license once it has completed its processing of license applications, 
but while actions required of other entities are still pending.126  Ideally, 
this policy should apply to all hydroelectric licenses. This would entirely 
remove the need to begin the protracted licensing process years ahead of 
the application deadline.  Rather, the process of working with stakeholders 
could continue, while the process over which FERC has control could be 
completed more efficiently.  It would also be advantageous for applicants 
and other entities to reach agreements amongst themselves, without the 
need of involving FERC at all.  FERC’s expertise does not include cultural 
resources or recreation.  There is no reason for FERC to serve in a capacity 
                                                          
121.  Id. 
122. Id. 
123.  George William Sherk, Approaching a Gordian Knot: The 
Ongoing State/Federal Conflict over Hydropower, 31 LAND & WATER L. REV., 1996, 
at 377-78.  
124. Pinchot, supra note 5, at 19–20.  
125.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Policy Statement on 
Conditioned Licenses for Hydrokinetic Projects (Nov. 30, 2007), available at 
https://www.ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20071130153255-PL08-1-000.pdf.  
126.  Id. 
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to enforce such agreements between the applicant and private interests.  
Such agreements should be excluded from the formal licensing process 
entirely, and should not take the form of conditions on FERC issued 
licenses.  MOUs could accomplish the same goals much more efficiently 
in a manner far more rational. 
 On the other hand, as long as other agencies and private interests 
remain vital parts of hydroelectric licensing, the licensing processes 
themselves need improvement.  The ALP and ILP clearly signify attempts 
by FERC to encourage collaboration between the masses of interested 
parties involved in hydroelectric licensing.  They also represent an 
understanding by FERC that applicants, and the innumerable stakeholders, 
often cannot be left to their own devices.  These processes represent an 
evolution over time from FERC as the expert evaluator of a license 
application, to becoming an entity tasked with guiding a group of 
demanding parties with potentially contradictory interests through a long, 
thorny process.  FERC has signaled its preference that parties simply work 
things out amongst themselves.127 However, the ALP, the most 
collaborative of the three processes, is not the default process; rather, the 
ILP is the default.  As discussed above, the ILP only contemplates dispute 
resolution of study disputes, leaving many potential disputes with no 
alternative resolution mechanism to employ. Furthermore, in the ILP, 
rather than forcing parties to reach agreements, FERC essentially resolves 
disputes by, for example, formally approving study plans and serving as a 
binding arbitrator in cases of study disputes.128  The ILP’s attempt to reach 
a speedy resolution is simply the imposition of strict deadlines for 
everyone involved, which does not allow the necessary time to engage in 
settlement discussions.  Conversely, the ALP’s lack of formal decisions 
by FERC along the way, absence of binding dispute resolution, and 
nonexistence of strict deadlines means the process can be stretched even 
beyond the expected duration.  Such an outcome may negate any of the 
                                                          
127.  Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, Policy Statement on 
Hydropower Licensing Settlements (Sept. 21, 2006), available at https://www. 
ferc.gov/whats-new/comm-meet/092106/H-1.pdf.  
128.  18 C.F.R. § 5.14. 
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benefits of cooperation and consensus that could be achieved.  If FERC 
hydroelectric licensing is going to remain inundated by other agencies and 
private interests, a process that combines some of the structure of the ILP 
with the collaboration of the ALP would likely be the more effective.  
However, the best approach would be to reduce the power of other federal 
agencies and remove stakeholder interests as rent-seekers from the formal 
licensing process, which would allow a return to the simplicity of the TLP 
of earlier generations. There are a number of improvements to 
hydroelectric licensing that are within FERC’s discretion that can be 
implemented relatively easily.  Unfortunately, for larger improvements, 
such as the reduction in authority granted to other federal agencies, 
statutory changes will be required. 
IV.  STATUTORY SOLUTIONS 
 
There are three goals toward which statutory reform should aim: 
1. Promoting efficiency as a goal of licensure regulation. Congress 
should ensure that, in the regulatory process, the federal 
government acts more as a singular regulator for the purpose of 
licensing, cooperating within itself and doing so on a timely basis. 
 
2. Creating institutional checks against the subjectivity of licensure 
regulation. Congress should curtail the power of resource 
agencies to unilaterally create conditions, promote a meaningful 
consideration of trade-offs within licensure analysis, and 
encourage private parties’ assumption of responsibilities for 
compensable activities entailed by a public-interest consideration. 
 
3. Exemptions from the standard licensing process. Congress should 
make a policy judgment that certain projects are likely to 
categorically deliver benefits net of costs or have de minimus 
impacts, and are therefore unsuited to the rigor and associated 
transaction costs of the intensive status quo of hydroelectric 
licensing regulation.  
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A. Promoting Efficiency in Licensure Regulation 
Both economics and environmental concerns generally should 
promote the retention of existing, clean generation over newly capitalized, 
fossil-fuel burning generation. Yet, hydroelectric licensing process is 
second only to nuclear licensing in terms of the length and cost of the 
regulatory process attached to it.  Randy Howard, the general manager of 
the Northern California Power Agency (NCPA), which serves publicly 
owned utilities, notes that hydroelectric projects now compare 
unfavorably to natural-gas-fired generating plants.  For NCPA’s existing 
259-megawatt North Fork Stanislaus River project, Howard expects that 
“relicensing the project will take thousands of internal labor hours, a 
minimum of 10 years, and [a] cost exceeding $50 million.”129  If one 
assumes that this $50 million is evenly distributed throughout that decade, 
the total cost of this capital is tens of millions of dollars greater yet.130  
Because the investment is a re-license, it would not be offset by any 
incremental gains in production at the project.  It is capital invested 
without the expectation of a return, apart from, the operator hopes, a 
preservation of the status quo.  Even then, because many licensing 
conditions end up decreasing the production of a facility, re-licensing a 
facility is akin to investing capital for the sake of a negative marginal 
return.  For those interested in new hydroelectric projects, the lack of a 
return on investment within a decade, together with the uncertainty about 
the project’s eventual licensing conditions, would kill many projects in the 
due diligence phase.  As the adage holds, time is money, and this is 
especially true for the capital-intensive power industry.  A regulatory 
                                                          
129.  Randy Howard, General Manager, Northern California Power 
Agency,  Address at  the House Natural Res. Subcommittee on Water, Power and 
Oceans, (May 3, 2017), available at https://naturalresources.house.gov/calendar/ 
eventsingle.aspx?EventID=401856.  
130.  For example, assuming a 7% cost of capital, an initial outlay of $5 
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process that lasts a decade can be understood to be a categorical failure. 
 FERC itself, like many others, has observed that, “The most 
effective way to reduce the cost and time of obtaining a hydroelectric 
license would be for Congress to make legislative changes necessary to 
restore the Commission’s position as the sole federal decisional authority 
for licensing conditions and processes.”131  Such a reform should be at the 
heart of any legislative proposal to reform hydroelectric licensing.  
 Since the passage of the FPA, which gave FERC the authority to 
issue hydroelectric power licenses to non-federal actors, what had been 
conceived of as a one-stop shop has evolved into a leviathan of multiple 
agencies. Rather than streamlining those agencies’ advice into a unified 
regulatory process, the process as it practically exists is highly balkanized.  
Indeed, the primary cause of delay in the licensing process is not the 
regulator with the ostensible responsibility to issue the license—FERC—
but instead other government agencies that have a legal duty to evaluate 
the project but lack accountability over their share of the 
regulatory process.132  
 FERC, as the issuer of the license, should have the ultimate 
accountability, and thus responsibility, for seeing this process to a 
transparent, efficient conclusion that affords due process to the applicant. 
In order to accomplish this, FERC should be given the authority to impose 
mandatory schedules on its sister agencies who have only an adjunct role 
in licensure.  
 The most recent statutory reform proposal would do just that. 
Under the bipartisan omnibus energy bill that the leading Republican and 
Democrat on the U.S. Senate’s Energy and Natural Resource Committee 
have been working on for multiple sessions, FERC would “act as the lead 
                                                          
131.  Devin Hartman and Tom Russo, Ebbing the Flow of Hydropower 
Red Tape, R Street Policy Study No. 105 (Aug. 2017), http://www.rstreet.org/policy-
study/ebbing-the-flow-of-hydropower-red-tape/ (citing Report on Hydroelectric 
Licensing Policies, Procedures, and Regulations, Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n 
(2001).  
132.  Hartman and Russo identify water-quality certifications under 
CWA and biological opinions pursuant to the ESA as “the worst culprits.” Id. at 5. 
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agency for the purposes of coordination of all applicable Federal 
authorizations” and for the purpose of complying with NEPA.133  While 
the legislative text is not particularly commanding—FERC “shall issue a 
rule establishing a process for setting a schedule”134—Sen. Lisa 
Murkowski and Sen. Maria Cantwell’s reforms would be the first 
significant action in many years to stand as a congressional mandate for 
cooperation, and its value should not be understated.135  The draft 
legislation would require FERC to issue a scheduling order unique to each 
application, which would be binding upon FERC itself and also other 
agencies, the applicant, and stakeholders engaged in the process.136 If a 
sister agency nonetheless did not follow the FERC-issued deadline, FERC 
could refer the matter to the presidential Office of Management and 
Budget for resolution.137  
B. Creating Institutional Checks Against Regulatory Subjectivity 
There are structural reforms that go beyond mere timeliness, 
however, which are necessary to ensure an appropriate regulatory process 
that does not unduly disadvantage hydropower among rival sources of 
electricity.  As we have explained above, the current regulatory process 
merely purports to engage in a process of economic evaluation the trade-
offs of an individual project’s benefits and costs, while falling short of 
actually doing so.  Perhaps the main problem here is that multiple 
agencies—each with their own institutional interests and subjective lens 
of review—are all able to impose mandatory conditions on a licensee. The 
result is a process which easily loses sight of the whole of the public 
interest, as the case studies above serve to demonstrate.  
                                                          
133.  Energy and Natural Resources Act of 2017, S. 1460, § 3001 (July 
2017) https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/senate-bill/1460/text. 
134.  Id. 
135.  U.S. Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Res., Senators 
Murkowski and Cantwell Introduce Broad, Bipartisan Energy and Natural Resources 
Bill (June 29, 2017), https://www.energy.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/6/ 
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136.  Id. 
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 The U.S. Forest Service, the FWS, and the NMFS should all be 
limited to an advisory role, issuing opinions that guide a singular 
regulator’s deliberation—namely, FERC’s.  The current process, codified 
as sections 4(e) and 16 of the FPA, is one which needlessly duplicates 
regulators and hamstrings an applicant’s due process because it is seldom 
clear whether these agencies are acting as a stakeholder within FERC’s 
licensing process, or as an adjudicator of mandatory licensing conditions. 
It is also the case that many aspects of a license that should likely be 
voluntary or reached through consensus are instead subject to a kind of 
bootstrapping, “me-too” regulation of the resource agencies; the Mystic 
Dam’s whitewater requirement is one such example.  One remedy for this 
would be to adopt a more adjudicatory approach in each agency venue, 
with more clearly defined roles and schedules.  While such a reform could 
promote due process, it would have the deleterious effect of further siloing 
the process and do damage to an overall attempt to streamline licensure 
regulation.  
 Legislative proposals currently under consideration fall short of 
this reform.  However, it is clear from their legislative text that the 
underlying problems are at least tacitly acknowledged.  Senators 
Murkowski and Cantwell’s proposal would require the Secretaries of 
Agriculture, Interior, and Commerce, or another high-ranking political 
appointee, to sign off on their respective resource agencies’ mandatory 
license conditions.138  The type of subjectivity identified earlier in this 
paper, we surmise, is in part the function of individual bureaucrats or 
groups of bureaucrats’ predilections for certain narrow interests, permitted 
to them by an insular agency setting.139  Requiring political accountability 
for license requirements at a higher level may cause the exercise of 
discretion to be more genuinely discretionary.  Likewise, disaffected 
applicants under the draft legislation could rely on “trial-type hearings” to 
dispute a particular license condition, although the administrative law 
                                                          
138.  Id.  
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judge (ALJ) presiding over this process would be statutorily restrained 
from finding that “any condition or prescription should be adopted, 
modified, or rejected”; the decision would be the relevant Secretary’s.140  
The ALJ’s opinion, in other words, would be essentially advisory in 
nature, at best scolding an agency for an over-the-top license condition. 
 Regulation in the name of “the public interest” is the high water 
mark of legislative delegation; “as the sole bounds of administrative 
decision-making, the standard is so capacious as to permit consideration 
of virtually anything that appears before the regulators or stakeholders.”141  
As we note above, it is a paradox that a concept so whole, so broad as the 
public interest could be derogated to a flyspeck analysis of small things, 
in a process which in practical terms lacks an analysis of trade-offs that 
NEPA purports to codify. Remedying this flaw is, in the main, an 
administrative and not a statutory undertaking. However, Congress could 
permit, as the Murkowski-Cantwell legislation would, FERC to undertake 
regional studies that would speak to multiple licenses within a particular 
basin, watershed, or river.142  Such studies would inform on a more whole 
basis the trade-offs of hydropower, and could render moot a needless 
series of ad hoc studies undertaken for individual, similar projects.  
Likewise, a requirement imposed on the regulator to compile best 
practices in methodologies for the studies antecedent to licensure would 
provide a trustworthy benchmark for applicants and the consultants who 
undertake biological and other studies.143  The way bureaucracies are 
staffed is another important consideration.  Agencies are people, at the end 
of the day, and rotating staff between responsible agencies and even tying 
personnel performance reviews to a staff member’s willingness to be 
seconded to a sister regulator is an innovative proposal to erase siloing—
in any case, it could not make matters any worse.144  Again, it bears 
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mentioning that these statutory enactments’ practical success relies 
primarily on agencies, and thus it should be contrasted to a deeper reform 
that puts FERC in a position as the singular arbiter of licensure.  
 The hydroelectric licensing process will always be subjective 
because of its character as a central planning exercise orbiting around a 
vague mandate.  Nevertheless, there are ways that stakeholders could be 
expected to better define the value of a condition to them.  This would 
allow the regulator to insist that stakeholders extracting a condition put 
their money where their mouths are, rather than allowing them to simply 
claim a public good in the regulatory process and having it attached by fiat 
to the license.  Consider again the case of Mystic Dam. The whitewater 
kayakers whose interest group obtained a license condition at Montana’s 
West Rosebud Creek are said to not even make particularly frequent use 
of their federally authorized entitlement of whitewater flows manufactured 
by foregoing hydroelectric production and passing water through the 
dam.145  Regardless of whether this is true, surely it is the case that the 
value of this kind of recreational licensing requirement exists as a function 
of its use. It should be considered, like water rights are in the Western 
United States, a usufructory right whose existence depends on its use and 
which balances against other uses.  In this case, the other use is the 
foregone hydroelectric generation, which has a more measurable value 
thanks to the commodity market for electricity.  In other words, there are 
two compensable interests in tension with one another.  Both should be 
monetized, and the recreationalist interest should be severable from the 
hydroelectric licensee to allow a real test in the demand for, and 
concomitant willingness to pay for, recreational opportunities.  The goal 
of such experiments would not necessarily be to extract revenue for the 
public coffers or for the hydroelectric licensee from recreationalists, but 
instead to measure demand for the recreational opportunity in question.  
Only then can a meaningful cost-benefit analysis of this trade-off occur.  
A good regulator should be equipped with the statutory power to both 
create such a concession, and to eliminate it and the underlying use if it 
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goes unused or has a demonstrably insignificant value compared to 
alternative uses.  The bottom line is that, in the hydroelectric licensing 
process, not everything should be an irrevocable entitlement because an 
accumulation of stakeholders does not, in itself, equal the public interest.  
Statutory reform should promote regulation’s making visible the trade-offs 
inherent in hydroelectric licensing.  
C. Exemptions From the Standard Licensing Process 
Finally, we have seen how even small projects, such as Kilarc-
Cow Creek, can be overwhelmed by the transaction costs of the relicensing 
process.  Congress should radically simplify the relicensing process for 
smaller dams.  If there are obvious and exceptional problems with their 
continued operation, the kind of politically accountable objection 
described above could be made to require a more detailed process. In 
addition to making license renewal more simple, upgrades to power-
generating equipment and changes in operation undertaken for 
environmental reasons should not be subject to extensive regulatory 
review.146  To continue the status quo in this regard creates a perverse 
incentive where public interest regulation acts as an effective block against 
both economic efficiency and environmental interests.  It would be strange 
indeed if hydroelectric licensing had transaction costs so significant that 
only large dams’ licensees would see the economic value in aggressively 
pursuing their continued operation, even though it is these large 
impoundment dams that have engendered the greatest consternation 
among environmentalists.147  
 Likewise, Congress should make a policy judgment that certain 
new hydroelectric projects are likely to categorically deliver benefits net 
of costs or have de minimus impacts.  These include existing 
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impoundments or hydro infrastructure, where most environmental damage 
is a consequence of this structure’s existence, and not the mere addition of 
hydroelectric generating unit.  Already, previous reforms have led FERC 
to categorically exempt new licensees who fit certain qualifications, such 
as being installed on existing conduits or non-powered dams.148  The 
projects that qualify for the existing exemptions are likely to be especially 
useful for the kind of balancing and ramping products, a greater need for 
which weather-dependent renewables have imposed on the electric grid.  
As is contemplated in the Murkowski-Cantwell legislation, Congress 
should also make it easier and quicker to obtain a license at non-powered 
dams.149  It should also require better cooperation between FERC and the 
federal agencies which own and operate certain dams for the purpose of 
increasing hydroelectric production.150  
 It is, ultimately, up to Congress to make a policy judgment about 
whether hydroelectric power—a clean, often dispatchable source which 
has no fuel-price risk and adds diversity of supply to the power sector—
should be over-regulated, as it is today, or whether to take steps that 
rationalize its regulation in the context of the wider economy for electric 
power. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 
 Hydroelectric licensing was meant to be rigorous, as the original 
congressional decision to vest it in a single, powerful federal regulator 
makes plain.  It was not, however, meant to be arbitrary and self-defeating.  
Today, the United States has moved far away from the original structure 
of hydroelectric regulation, and not for the better. It is nearly impossible 
to find a regulatory process that is more time-consuming, less streamlined, 
or more muddled in its public-interest objectives.  This has happened not 
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because hydroelectric licensing has been the particular object of 
congressional reform, in which case Congress might have simply added 
new requirements to the pre-existing central regulator. Instead, the 
hydroelectric industry has had the misfortune of being swept up in the 
expansive congressional enactments of the 1970s and ’80s.  Additionally, 
tied to nothing but its original statutory mandate of public-interest 
regulation, hydroelectric licensing lacks a unifying principle, and it is a 
hostage to the institutional subjectivity of administrative agencies.  The 
administrative and statutory reform proposals that have been enacted in 
recent years are a comment on this broken system, and would 
incrementally improve the practice of regulation.  However, they do not 
go far enough to remedy the problems of duplication and ambiguity that 
are at the core of a problem that causes regulation of this sector to be 
almost irredeemably arbitrary and dilatory.  
